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FOREWORD 
The integrating 'meta-model' underlying IIASA's Technology- 
Economy-Society Program is the life cycle, which appears to be 
applicable both to technologies and to industries. One of our 
most important research tasks is to increase our understanding of 
the dymamics of the life cycle. 
In general, the life cycle begins with a major innovation or 
'breakthrough'. But most economists have always had difficulty 
explaining such breakthroughs, insofar as they require longer- 
term, high-risk investments. The authors of this paper suggest 
that investment behavior is a function of the life cycle itself. 
If so, one can perhaps begin to understand how the end of one 
cycle leads into the next. 
Thomas H. Lee 
Program Leader, 
Technoiogy-Economy-Society 
Abstract 
This paper argues that time-preference functions (.or 
'discount rates') for R&D should properly be considered to be 
functions of the economic environment. In particular, during 
periods of accelerating growth and general increasing prosperity 
it is appropriate and rational to prefer a marginal dollar in the 
present to a marginal dollar in the future. Conversely, during 
periods of saturating growth and deteriorating prospects, the 
converse holds: it is rational to prefer a marginal dollar in 
the future to one in the present. Periods of increasing general 
prosperity--rising tide--are likely to be associated with the 
early phases of an industry 'life cycle'. Periods of declining 
prosperity, by contrast, may occur towards the end of the life 
cyc le . 
The implications for R&D policy are derived in terms of a 
simple model. The results suggest that at the beginning of the 
life cycle the optimal R&D policy is to invest in short-term, low 
risk ventures (i . e. product or process improvements) . Late in 
the cycle, however, the optimal policy reverses to long-term 
high-risk projects. In simple terms: a firm in a declining 
industry needs to find a new product or business to replace the 
old one. Unfortunately, the appropriate behavior is discouraged 
by most existing B/C methodologies. 
TIWE PREFERENCE ABD THE LIFE CYCLE: THE LOGIC OF LONG-TERM 
HIGH RISK VS. SHORT-TERX LOV RISK 
Robert U. Ayres 
Shunsuke War1 
Introduction 
It can perhaps be taken for granted, in what follows, that 
project (or venture) evaluation and selection are core activities 
in a modern business organization. Some of the reasons will be 
discussed later. This paper addresses a critical issue in 
venture evaluat ion/select ion methodology. In principle, many 
interrelated factors must be considered, as indicated by the 
schematic diagram of and R&D allocation model (Figure 1). A 
number of large corporations have developed and use such models. 
At the heart of any such mode1 or procedure, however, is a 
quantitative comparison between alternative ventures in terms of 
their attractiveness as investment opportunt ies. Typically, the 
problem is conceptualized as the allocation of a fixed budget 
among the annual requirements of a portfolio of ventures, in 
rank-order of priority, until the available funds are exhausted. 
The schematic diagram (Figure 11, complex as it is, glosses over 
many difficulties, such as exactly how to calculate the effect of 
R&D expenditures on earnings or on the impact of changes in 
product mix on sales. 
These rather obvious difficulties may tend to disguise a 
much more fundamental problem, namely how to meaningfully compare 
projects that absorb funds at different rates for different 
periods, and generate profits in different amounts at very 
different times in the future. In short, how does one compare a 
modest, inexpensive, short-term prod ect with a very ambitious, 
expensive long-term one? 
Two more or less equivalent approaches are in general use. 
One approach is to reduce each project, regardless of time 
variation, to an equivalent 'present value' . This is done by (1) 
calculating a time-varying pattern of future income or profits, 
(2) discountinq each future increment to a present value, and (3)  
summing them up to a total. This sum can be compared to the 
total projected investment (also discounted>, and the ratio or 
return-on-investment (ROI ) can then be computed. 
The second approach, which is less common, is to project an 
annual percentage yield on the capital investment over a target 
lifetime (allowing for capital replacement) and compare that to 
the yield on funds invested in long-term bonds or other financial 
instruments over the same period. Again, a simple ratio can be 
derived. Although discounting per se is not explicitly required 
in the second approach, it is obvious that to reduce a time- 
varying future income stream to a supposedly equivalent annual 
rate of return does not really avoid the problem, but rather 
shoves it under the rug. It is more intellectually honest (and 
usually more realistic) to confront the issue of discounting--or 
time-preference--directly and explicity. 
-A Earnings 1 
fx?enCitures Product ?!ix 
Figure 1 .  S i c p l i f i e a  diaqrar.  of ?ED resource a l l oca t i on  r.odel.  
Source : Zlackr,ar, 1 9  7 3  
Tke TLeorv of Discount  i n q  
The s z a n d a r d  fo rmal  t h e o r y  of b e n e f i t / c o s t  a n a l y s i s  is 
p r e d i c a t e d  on t h e  n o t i o n  of a i s c o u n z i n g  t o  compensate l o r  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t .  S p e c i f i c a l i y ,  it is t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a r g u e d  t h a z  
a  marginal  d o l l a r  of income i n  t h e  f u t u r e  must be d i s c o u n t e d  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  a  m a r g i n a l  d o l l a r  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  s i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  
c o u l d  be i n v e s t e d  i n  a  s a v i n g s  bank ( o r  e q u i v a l e n t )  where it w i l l  
e a r n  i n t e r e s t .  T h e  arguments  i n  t h e  economics l i t e r a z u r e  t e n d  t o  
r e v o l v e  a round  t h e  " r i g h t "  c h o i c e  of a  d i s c o u n t - r a t e  f o r  p u b l i c  
v s .  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  p r o j e c t s ,  and  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  ( m o r t a l )  vi's h 
v f s  f i r m s  ( i m m o r t a l ) .  There  seems t o  be no doub t  among t h e s e  
a u t h o r s  t h a t  some c h o i c e  ( r o u g h l y  i n  t h e  r a n g e  3%-8%) is 
" c o r r e c t " .  
Arrow [Arrow 761 h a s  i a e n t i f  i e d  two fundamenta l  
j u s t  i f  icat i o n s  f o r  d i s c o u n t i n g :  
(1) Pure  u t i l i t y  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  = t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  
goods = i n t e r e s t  ra+e 
The f i r s t  of t h e s e  is t h e  economic e q u i v a l e n t  of i n c r e a s i n g  
e n t r o p y ,  o r  " t i m e '  s" ar row.  I t  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  d o l l a r  
d e l i v e r e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  h a s  less u t i l i t y  t h a n  a p r e s e n t  d o l l a r ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  P igou CPigou 283 a t t r i b u t e d  it t o  
a  "weakness i n  o u r  t e l e s c o p i c  f a c u l t y 1 '  c a u s i n g  u s  t o  see " f u t u r e  
p l e a s u r e s ,  a s  it w e r e ,  on a d i m i n i s h e d  scale" (pp .  24-25).  I t  is 
wide ly  assumed t o  be a n  e m p i r i c a l  f a c t .  However, t h i s  c a n  be 
c h a l l e n g e d ,  i n  t h e  l i g h t  of r e c e n t  e v i d e n c e  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .  
The second J u s t i f i c a t i o n  is s i m p l y  t h a t ,  i f  o u r  d e s c e n d e n t s  !or 
w e  o u r s e l v e s )  a r e  g o i n g  t o  be r i c h e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t h a n  w e  a r e  
t o d a y ,  it d o e s  n o t  make s e n s e  t o  t r a d e  a p r e s e n t  d o l l a r  f o r  a  
f u t u r e  one on a one-for-one b a s i s .  
We a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  " p u r e  u t i l i t y 1 '  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s ,  a t  a 
d e e p e r  l e v e l ,  a l s o  based  on t h e  assumed growth of consumpt ion.  
C e r t a i n l y ,  f i n a n c i a i  i n v e s t m e n t s  c a n n o t  e a r n  i n t e r e s t ,  on t h e  
a v e r a g e ,  u n l e s s  r e a l  economic growth is o c c u r r i n g  a t  t h e  s a m e  
t i m e .  The e x a c t  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between GNP growth a n d  
r e a l  i n t e r e s t  ra tes  is open t o  some d e b a t e ,  b u t  t h e  two s e e m  t o  
t r a c k  t o g e t h e r  f a i r l y  c l o s e l y .  In  any  e v e n t ,  most a u t h o r s  
w r i t i n g  on t h e  s u b j e c t  s e e m  t o  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
d i s c o u n t  r a t e  is c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  a  long- term i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
T h i s  h a s  two d i r e c t  i m p l i c a t i o n s :  
(a)  The d i s c o u n t  r a t e  is a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t  6 i n  t h e  
d e c r e a s i n g  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  e x p o n e n t i a l  f u n c t i o n  
(b) The c o n s t a n t  6 c a n  be chosen  "once  f o r  a l l " ,  i n  
p r i n c i p l e .  
A number of a u t h o r s  i n c l u d i n g  CRamsey 281,  [ P a g e  771 and  
CGeorgescu-Roegen 791 have a r g u e d  t h a t  c! s h o u l d  be z e r o ,  on  
e t h i c a i  qrounds,  t o  ensure  t h a t  i n t e r e s t s  of f u t u r e  generaZions  
i e . g .  i n  t h e  environment)  be g iven  t h e  same weight a s  i n t e r e s t s  
of t hose  now a l i v e  and " v o t i n g ' .  T h i s  is a n o t h e r  way or' s t a t i n g  
t h e  view, s e t  f o r t h  by J e f f e r s o n ,  , t h a t  t h e  environment is a  
c o m n  p rope r ty  of a l l  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  h e l d  " in -usu f ruc t "  by t h e  
l i v i n g .  However, i n  g e n e r a l ,  most economists  would choose a  
p o s i t i v e  non-zero d i scount  r a t e  somewhere between .03 (3%) and 
. B S  ( a % > ,  depending on assumptions  about  i n f l a t i o n  and t a x e s .  
Brrow, f o r  example, s t a t e d  i n  h i s  1976 paper t h a t  6 o r  7 pe rcen t  
"sounds l i k e  t h e  r i g h t  k ind  of r a t e "  on a c o n s t a n t  va lue  b a s i s  
( ze ro  i n f l a t i o n )  . Elsewhere ( i b i d )  he d i v i d e s  t h i s  ( roughly)  
e q u a l l y  between t h e  two components no ted  above,  i .  e .  i n  t h e  
"neighborhood of 3%" f o r  "pure" t i m e  u t i l i t y  and 4-5% f o r  growth- 
of-consumpt i o n  ( agg rega t ed ) .  
A s  r e g a r d s  "pure" t ime u t i l i t y ,  Arrow cop. c i t .  ) a r g u e s  t h a t  
it is an e m p i r i c a l  (and presumably u n i v e r s a l )  f a c t .  H e  does  not  
a t t empt  t o  e x p l a i n  it. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  it is not a 
u n i v e r s a l  phenomenon b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  a n  occas iona l  one, an  
e x p l a n a t i o n  would be h e l p f u l .  Indeed, d i s c o u n t i n g  behavior  on 
t h e  p a r t  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  can  e a s i l y  be e x p l a i n e d  by f i n i t e  j o b  
and l i f e  expectancy.  For middle-aged and o l d e r  people ,  
e s p e c i a l l y ,  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  immediate consumption would be 
n a t u r a l  i n  view of t h e  non-zero p o s s i b i l i t y  of not  being a l i v e  t o  
en joy  it l a t e r .  The same p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  (even more s t r o n g l y ,  
perhaps)  i n  t h e  case of c o r p o r a t e  managers w i th  l i m i t e d  j o b  
t e n u r e .  A p r o j e c t  wi th  c o s t s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  but  y i e l d i n g  
b e n e f i t s  i n  t h e  more remote f u t u r e  may a c t u a l l y  be a  l i a b i l i t y  t o  
t h e  mobile mid-level manager who is e v a l u a t e d  i n  t h e  b a s i s  of 
c u r r e n t  performance a t  t h e  "bottom l i n e "  and who w i l l  be not  be 
i n  h i s  p o s i t i o n  long enough t o  c l a i m  t h e  c r e d i t  f o r  t h e  payof f .  
Not s u p r i s i n g l y ,  managers expec t ing  t o  be t r a n s f e r r e d  away i n  2 
o r  3 y e a r s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  i n v e s t  i n  any th ing  wi th  a payoff  5 o r  
10 y e a r s  away. 
Thus t h e  phenomenon of "pure" t i m e  u t i l i t y  i n  t h e  s e n s e  of 
sho r t - t e rm o r i e n t a t i o n  c a n  e a s i l y  be exp la ined  i n  p r i n c i p l e  a s  a 
consequence of s h o r t  j o b  t e n u r e  and/or f i n i t e  m o r t a l i t y .  Indeed, 
t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  i n f e r i o r  management performance of major U .  S. 
based mul t i -na t iona l  c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  r e c e n t  decades  v i s  a v i s  
comparable Japanese  ( o r  European) f i r m s  wi th  longer  and more 
s e c u r e  management t e n u r e  can  be regarded  as  evidence t h a t  t h e  
?henomenon is q u i t e  r e a l  ( e .  g .  C Hayes & Abernathy 811 > . 
Of c o u r s e ,  it goes  wi thout  s a y i n g  t h a t  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  
impersonal and immortal management i n t e l l i g e n c e  i d e n t i f i e d  on ly  
wi th  t h e  well-being of t h e  f i r m ,  o r  t h e  s o c i a l  e n t i t y ,  would no t  
be a f f e c t e d  by such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  To be s u r e ,  r e a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  not made by impersonal  inunortal 
decision-makers.  Neve r the l e s s  some economis t s  might a rgue  t h a t  
t h e  " f r e e ,  compe t i t i ve  market" is i t s e l f  a n  example of a n  
impersonal  and i m m r t a l  decision-making i n t e l l i g e n c e .  F i n a n c i a l  
and commodity markets  a r e  probably t h e  f r e e s t  and most 
compe t i t i ve  of a l l  markets.  We a l s o  have a  c l e a r l y  a r t i c u l a t e d  
t h e o r y ,  due t o  H o t e l l i n g  [ H o t e l l i n g  381 t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  
shadow p r i c e  o r  s c a r c i t y  r e n t  (above e x t r a c t i o n  c o s t s )  of 
e x h a u s t i b l e  mine ra l s  shou ld  rise a t  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  market r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  on o t h e r  (monetary) investments .  In o t h e r  words, t h e  
opportunity cast of leaving minerals in the ground tine. 
extracting them later rather than immediateiy) should be equal to 
the impiicit market discount rate. 
Hoteliing's model is simple enough to carry conviction. If 
there is any "pure" time utility (apart from the increasing 
prosperity or growth-of-consumption factor) it should be 
reflected by mineral commodity markets. Yet, the empirical 
record seems to show otherwise. In particular, Dresch C Dresch 
841 finds that resource prices in almost all cases have risen 
more slowly than the market rate of interest, over a period of 
many decades. It is therefore argued here that for an 
Fm~ersonal, immortal decisicn-maker, at least, there is no such 
thinx as pure time utility. In any discussion of decision-making 
in terms of the utility of an immortal entity (i. e. a firm) it 
can properly be ignored. 
The market rate of interest, in real terms, can be regarded 
as a rough measure of the "expected increasing prosperity" 
factor, as applied to the economy as a whole. However, as noted 
already in the discussion of "pure" time preference, factar may 
be quite different, both for individuals and for f irns in 
specific circumstances. Frequently, an expectation of the 
"continuously increasing prosperity" is unreal ist ic. Indeed, for 
many--if not most--individuals approaching retirement age it is 
contrary to fact. Most working people must look forward to a 
period, in old age, of sharply reduced income and an increased 
probability of high medical or health-related expenses that may 
not be fully covered by insurance or social security. Thus 
people are motivated to save "for a rainy day", even if the 
savings depreciate in real terms due to hyper-inflation as in 
much of the 1970's. This behavior can only be explained by an 
effectively negative discount rate for some people at certain 
times in their lives. Nor does the "increasing prosperity" 
assumption hold true in general for firms.' 
In fact, we propose that the concept of a well-defined or 
unique discount rate should be discarded, because of its 
misleading connotations. In its place, the notion of a time 
preference function applicable to specific circumstances suggests 
itself. The following model is proposed: Consider a decision 
maker (DM) and a lottery with unit payoffs at various future 
t imes. Let W(t) be a function that defines the utility of 
receiving a unit payoff (e.g. winning a lottery) at future time t 
relative to the utility of a unit payoff at time zero CW(o) = 1). 
It is clear that W(t) depends on the perceived value of receiving 
a unit payoff in the future as compared to the present. This 
depends not on the payoff itself, but on the DM' s expected level 
of prosperity at future time t. If the DM is a person, this 
would depend on hidher expected income from job and/or secure 
investments. If the DM is the CEO of a firm representing the 
interests of its stockholders, W(t) depends on the expected 
'Indeed, Arrow himself acknowledges (op. cit. ) that it is 
really only true for the aggregate of all investments over a very 
long period--or for society as a whole. By implication, it is 
not always true for either individuals or for firms. 
fijrure prof itability of the firm' s existing (core) Susine5s. 
I T  is rraditional in business plans and reports to 
stockholders to project ever-increasing growth and profitability. 
3ut this kind of projection often disguises real, and 
predictable, problems. For example, a corner grocer with a iong 
established 'niche' in some neighborhood may learn that a chain 
store is planning to locate a branch store across the street. 
Or, a drug company with a prafitable proprietary drug may have to 
face up to the expiration of its patent protection and the entry 
of low cost generic competitors into the market. In fact, few 
business enterprises are safe from competition by a new 
technology or from a better-financed or lower cost "brand x" 
competitor. When such competition becomes visible on the horizon 
the profitability of current operations can be reasonably 
expected to decline. Under these conditions, the utility of a 
lottery with a payoff in the future can be greater than the 
utilitv of a lottery with a payoff in the present. (Hereafter 
the term "lottery" can be replaced by "R&D project", and the 
"payoff" is a net contribution to corporate income-). 
Management Options in Relation to the Life Cycle 
At first glance the conclusion of the previous section 
appears to contradict one of the most standard assumptions of 
economics: that a dollar received in the present will never 
decline in utility because it can alwavs be reinvested at 
positive real interest rates, e.g. by purchasing government bonds 
or T-bills. In reality, however, there is no assurance that real 
interest rates will always be positive. Moreover, for a non- 
financial business firm with no existing debt to repay the 
implied choice is not necessarily available: current profits are 
subject to tax and must be declared and distributed (in part, at 
least > to stockholders. Woreover, for such a firm purely 
financial investments are not generally acceptable, except for 
reasonable reserves. The choice is usually (1) to invest in 
expanding the existing business, (2) to invest in short-term 
product or process improvements, (3)  to invest in long-term major 
innovations, either in production technology or new products, ( 4 )  
to diversify by acquiring or merging with other profitable 
existing businesses. 
In a perfect financial market, the last alternative is 
equivalent either to a financial investment (in the absence of 
"special" synergies such as countercyclic behavior or vertical 
2We assume for clarity that any payoff must be consumed (not 
reinvested) if it is received. In some cases a transfer of 
surplus funds forward in time is possible. Thus a near-term 
payoff that is simply held "in escrow" (earning interest) might 
be regarded as equivalent to a long-term payoff. However, this 
comparison is misleading, since the corresponding reverse 
transfer (backward in time) is not possible. In any case, for a 
firm, income must be credited (and taxed) in the year received. 
In general, it cannot be carried forward and regarded as income 
in a later year. 
integration yielding economies af scale or scope) or TO a 
successful R&a project. in fact, -there is a good reason 20 
believe most mergers are profitable only to the investment 
bankers, iawyers and brokers. There is a growing bociy of 
evidence based on ex ~ o s t  studies suggesting  hat the synergies 
are illusory and the risks greatly outweigh the benefits [Louis 
321 , For purposes of this discussion, however, the 
"diversification option" is ruled out of further consideration. 
The viable options are, in brief (1) expand without innovation, 
(2) short-term incremental product improvement or cost cutting, 
(3) long-term major innovation with greater risk and greater 
returns. 
Consider now two possibiiities: suppose, first, that the DM 
for the firm anticipates a "rising tide" of continuously growing 
revenues and profits based on vigorous expansion of the market as 
a whole, rising incomes, etc. In this case, he probably has no 
problem deciding what to do with excess cash. If the industry is 
operating at or near capacity the obvious strategy is to invest 
in expanding capacity and holding market share. Or, if there is 
some excess current capacity, cash can be invested in short-term 
R+D to improve the product and make it more attractive, or to cut 
production costs. But now suppose, on the other hand the 
following scenario: the DM'S advisors forecast a future period of 
declining profitability, or even of losses, due to rising 
competition, higher costs, shrinking markets, or some 
combination, even taking into account all known opportunities for 
product or process improvement. The problem is now of a 
different sort, namely to replace the existing business. Since 
the merger/acquisition option has been excluded, this leaves only 
the long-term R+D option. At least, so it would appear on the 
basis of a qualitative argument. 
Can the argument be quantified? A fairly simple approach is 
suggested in the following paragraphs. The first step is ta 
characterize the utility of a marginal unit of profit as a 
function of future time, as a function of perceived future market 
conditions. Basically, if continued prosperity is expected 
(scenario I), the utility of a marginal dollar declines with 
time, as shown in Figure 2. On the other hand, if an "end to 
prosperity" is expected, the situation is portrayed in Figure 3 
(scenario 11). 
The concept of. a natural 'life cycle' for products, 
technologies and industries is now quite widely accepted. The 
cycle begins with conception (1.e. innovation) and runs through 
successive stages of 'childhood', 'adolescence', 'maturity' and 
'senescence'. Each stage has characteristic behavior patterns. 
The apparent aging process in terms of industries was noted and 
discussed extensively by economists as far back as the 1930's 
CAlderfer & Xichl 421. The international trade and locational 
dimension was emphasized by Vernan [Vernon 861, and the 
technological aspect has been elaborated particularly by 
Albernathy & Utterback CAlbernathy % Utterback 751. A detailed 
characterization of the life cycle concept need not be included 
here. Suffice it to say that scenario I is a reasonable 
description of the view at an early stage of the life cycle (e.g. 
childhood or adolescence). On the other hand, scenario 1 1  is a 
{iescription corresponding to the late mature or senescent stayes. 
It is clearly vital for senior management to deteraine where in 
the cycle each of its businesses is at any given time. 
Scenario I (Figure 2)  may be 'normal' far society as a whols 
in the very long run. At least, it seems applicable since the 
indus~rial revolution. However scenario I 1  (Figure 3) is really 
the normal situation for most large firms, in the sense that a 
continuation of existing activities ("static operations") cannot 
be expected to result in continuously increasing revenues and 
profits for the indefinite future (Figure 4 ) .  Of course, 
competent and successful organization plans (and expects) to fill 
tie "sales gap" either by improvement of existing products and 
opera~ions or by innovation/acquisition of new products. But it 
is important to recognize that the necessary actions to fill the 
sales gap--which require risky investments--will be taken if 
increasing prosperity is taken for granted. 
In fact, the "sales gap" is a normal feature of the scene 
from the executive suite of the multi-product, multi-business 
corporation. The job of the DM, of course, is to see to it that 
the gap forecast is, in some sense, a self-denying one. In other 
words, his primary responsibility is to initiate the actions 
needed to fill the projected gap. He is unlikely to be 
successful in doing so, however, if he is using a decision- 
making (benefit/cost) formula that implicitly assumes a 
continuation of the present trend (of increasing prosperity) by 
heavily discounting the future. The situation is akin to riding 
a bicycle: stability requires forward motion. If the rider 
takes continued stability for granted and stops pedalling, the 
bicycle will slow dawn and topple over. 
As a working hypothesis, it seems reasonable to assert that, 
looking ahead to a future time t, the stockholder's real time 
preference function is something like 
where <y(t) represents the expected stream of profits fram pre- 
existinq products or activities, over time. 
The Choice of R+D Project 
Apart fram issues of time preference, there are two major 
factors that must be considered in selecting among possible R+D 
pro1 ects. They are: 
(1) the probability (P, > of technical success ii. e. it 
works) in relation to R&D expenditures and time 
(2) the probability (P:,) of marlret success (1. e. it sells), 
assuming it is a technical success. 
With regard to (1) above, it is clear that, other factors 
remaining equal, the probability of technical success is an 
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i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of r e s e a r c h  i n t e n s i t y .  
2 .  Wyatt C Wyatt 861 mentioned t h e  t r a d e o f f  between t e c h n i c a l  
s u c c e s s  p r o b a b i l i t y  and  r e s e a r c h  d u r a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  he 
f o l l o w i n g  s i m p l e  model, where it is assumed t h a t  a  r e s e a r c h  
program c o n s i s t s  of n  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s ,  e a c h  of which c o n t i n u e s  
f o r  o n l y  one p e r i o d  and h a s  a c e r t a i n  independen t  s u c c e s s  
p r o b a b i l i t y .  Determining t h e  t o t a l  r e s e a r c h  program p e r i o d ,  s a y  
z (i n ) ,  and d i s t r i b u t i n g  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s  among them, many 
r e s e a r c h  programs c a n  be g e n e r a t e d .  The r e s e a r c h  program is 
t e r m i n a t e d  when a t  l e a s t  one of t h e  p r o j e c t s  s u c c e e d s  o r  t i m e  z 
is reached .  
Expected  r e s e a r c h  program d u r a t i o n  tz )  a n d  e x p e c t e d  c o s t  
(EC) c a n  be t h e n  f o r m u l a t e d  and  some n u m e r i c a l  examples  e x h i b i t  a  
convex t ime-cos t  t r a d e o f f  c u r v e  between them. 
Although t h e  above f o r m u l a t i o n  i m p l i e s  a n  o p t i m a l  r e s e a c h  
s c h e d u l e ,  it n e g l e c t s  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  of r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s  and  
t h e  l e a r n i n g  e f f e c t s ,  a s  Wyatt n o t e d .  But when t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  
of R8D r e s e a r c h  is d i s c u s s e d ,  t h e s e  dynamic e f f e c t s  may p l a y  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  a s  w e l l  a s  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  b e h a v i o r  of t h e  
e n t r e p r e n e u r .  
H e r e ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  f o c u s  on t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between t i m e  
p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  and e x i s t i n g  knowledge and l e a r n i n g  e f f e c t ,  
w e  employ a s e q u e n t i a l  r e s e a r c h  program where c o s t  o r  r e s e a r c h  
i n t e n s i t y ,  s a y  j , is t i m e  c o n s t a n t .  Theref  o r e  i n  o u r  model,  EC 
is a lways  e q u a l  t o  ( z > j .  
Though s u c c e s s  may n e v e r  be a s s u r e d ,  its p r o b a b i l i t y  a l s o  
i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  e l a p s e d  t i m e  because  new knowledge may become 
a v a i l a b l e  a t  no c o s t  by " d i f f u s i o n "  f rom e x t e r n a l  s o u r c e s .  I n  
f a c t ,  t h e  s a m e  t o t a l  e f f o r t  is p e r h a p s  more l i k e l y  t o  lead t o  
s u c c e s s  i f  it is s p r e a d  o v e r  a l o n g e r  p e r i o d ,  because  of t h e  
d i f f u s i o n  f a c t o r .  
Somezixes a  " c r a sh "  grogram can  s h o r t s n  tlze zime r e q ~ l i r e d  
f a r  r e s e a r c h ,  e .  q .  by t e s t i n g  many a l t e r n a t i v e  app roaches  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  Cin p a r a l l e l )  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  sequence .  The 
s e q u e n t i a l  approach  t e n d s  t o  be much l e s s  e x p e n s i v e ,  however, 
t h a n  t h e  p a r a l l e l  approach s i n c e  t h e  l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  by t h e  
r e s e a r c h e r s  from e ach  u n s u c c e s s f u l  t r i a l  c a n  make t h e  n e x t  
a t t e m p t  more e f f i c i e n t .  I t  is assumed t h a t  enough is known a 
p r i o r 1  abou t  t h e  r e s e a r c h  problem t o  d e f i n e  a  program and 
d e t e r m ine  a n  ' o p t i m a l '  R&D e f f o r t  w i t h  a f i x e d  annua l  b u d j e t  j .  
The r e s e a r c h  t h e n  c o n t i n u e s  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  u n t i l  t h e  problem is 
s a l v e d  o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  is t e r m i n a t e d .  The l e n g t h  of t i m e  needed 
t o  s o l v e  t h e  problem is a l s o  a  f u n c t i o n  of its i n t r i n s i c  
difficulty o r  its " t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d i s t a n c e "  f rom t h e  s za t e -o f - t he -  
a r t  (SOA) . I t  is a l s o  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  p o s t u l a t e - '  t h a t  t h e  
c um u la t i ve  p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u c c e s s  P , ( t >  by t i m e  t is g i v e n  by t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  
whence 
P l  ( t> = C 1  + e x p  j i T - t > l - I  (3) 
H e r e  j is a  measure of t h e  r e s e a r c h  i n t e n s i t y  and T is t h e  t i m e  
when t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u c c e s s  r e a c h e s  0 . 5 .  For  some s h o r t - t e r m  
"improvements" t h e  i n i t i a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u c c e s s  P, can  be 
g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  which i m p l i e s  a  n e g a t i v e  v a l u e  of T .  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  P < t )  of a b r eak th rough  o c c u r r i n g  
between t i m e  t and t i m e  t +  t is g i v e n  by t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  
The e xp ec t ed  c o s t  of r e s e a r c h  a t  c o n s t a n t  annua l  r a t e  of 
e x p e n d i t u r e  j is g i v e n  by summing up t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
( c on t i nu ed )  f a i l u r e  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d  t i m e s  t h e  c o s t  of c o n t i n u e d  
r e s e a r c h  f o r  t h e  n e x t  p e r i o d .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  of c o n t i n u e d  
""However, it s h o u l d  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  o t h e r  f o r m u l a t i o n s  
a r e  a l s o  p l a u s i b l e .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Mansf ie ld  h a s  deve loped  a  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c  model of t h e  R&D c h o i c e  p r o c e s s  CMansfield 681. 
However M a n s f i e l d ' s  s t u d y  d i d  no t  a d d r e s s  t h e  t r a d e o f f  between 
long- term,  h i g h  r i s k  p r o j e c t s  and s h o r t - t e r m ,  low r i s k  p r o j e c t s .  
Substituting ( 3 )  into ( 5 ) ,  the integration can be carried out 
esactly, yielding 
Turning now to the calculation of benefits, a collection of 
assorted investment projects can then be evaluated and compared 
in terms of expected payoff (or profitability) if successful vs. 
 roba ability of market success. Market success is a. combination 
of technical and other factors. If one assumes the existence 
of an equilibrium risk-return tradeoffd it is evident that any 
projects offering unusually high return in relation to perceived 
risk will be quickly selected out and thus removed from the list 
of candidates. One with too high a risk, on the other hand, will 
never be selected. Figure 6 illustrates typical relationships. 
The "best" projects will be those with the highest value V for a 
given combined probability of success or (equivalently) those 
with the highest probability of success for a specified payoff 
,value. Either way of looking at it, the best projects are to be 
found on the "envelope"' illustrated in Figure 6. One of the key 
points to note is that potential products or processes with 
largest maximum payoff's are also likely to be technologically 
farthest away from the State-of-the-Art (SOA), hence inherently 
riskiest. Along the envelope, therefore, one would expect V to 
be an. increasing function of technological difficulty or 
' distance' ; such as 
where A, a are parameters. 
A convenient surrogate measure of technological 'distance' 
(J) for our purposes, is 
J = jt, 
"See, for example [Conrad & Plotkin 681 . 
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T3us J is, i n  e l f e c t ,  t h e  c u m u i a t i v e  c o s t  01 r e s e a r c h  i f  
c o n ~ i n u e d  t o  t i m e  t,. E v i d e n t l y  V ( J > ,  a s  d e f l n e t i  above and 
approximated  by t 7 ) ,  a l r e a d y  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  p r o b a b i i l t y  or' 
inarket s u c c e s s  (P,). However, f o r  what f a l l o w s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  ? o r =  
a f  ( 7 )  need n o t  be s p e c f f  i e d .  The a n a i y s i s  which f o l l o w s  is 
independent  of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ' t i a e l e s s '  v a i u e ,  market 
r i s k  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d i i f f c u l ~ y .  
One can now c a l c u l a t e  t h e  expected b n e f i t r  BB of a n  R+D 
p r o j e c t ;  s t a r t i n g  a t  ti- t = 0 and t e r m i n a t i n g  a t  ti= t,, v i z .  
where V ( t )  depends i n v e r s e l y  on r r < t )  ( equat ion  1) and T ( t >  is t h e  
expected con t inu ing  s t r e a m  of p r o f i t s  from pre -ex i s t ing  s o u r c e s  
o r  s ta t i c  opera t ions .  The second t e r m  r e p r e s e n t s  1-diate 
success  p o s s i b i l i t y .  
Equation (9) can f i r s t  be i n t e g r a t e d  by p a r t s ,  y i e l d i n g  
I t  is convenient t o  approximate V ( t )  by a 5 parameter func t ion :  
where 
and 
I t  is convenient ,  h e r e a f t e r ,  t o  d e f i n e  
It is shown in the Appendix that 
Substituting (15 and (16) into (61, 
Obviously the net benefits BB are given by 
from (17) and (18). 
An investor or corporate decision-nmker (DM) is presumably 
confronted by given values of the term VP,, which is determined 
by some combination of the possibilities of technology and the 
attributes of the market place. Similarly, the Dl4 is confronted 
by a particular form of W(t), which can be defined in terms of 
given values of the parameters <C, C, Cz D, D7). The 
characterization of V<t> is a function of perceptions about the 
stage of the product or technology 'life cycle' and its 
implications for the future prospects of. the exsiting business 
(Figures 3, 4 ) .  Early in the life cycle it may be reasonable to 
expect "continued growth and prosperity" for the foreseeable 
future. On the other hand, in the mature stage of the cycle, as 
markets approach saturation and/or competing technologies become 
established, it is realistic to anticipate the approach of much 
harder times, 1. e. "the end of prosperity". At the beginning of 
the life cycle V(t) is a decreasinq function, whence D, = Dt = 8. 
Towards the end of the cycle, on the other hand, V(t) is an 
increasinq function, which implies Dt > 0 or D, > 0. Either way, 
V<t) is not a decision variable for the DM. 
I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  ~ h r e e  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  o r  ' c o n ~ r o i s '  
a c c e s s i b l e  t o  t h e  decis ion-maker  a r e  j ,  T and  t,. In  p r a c t i c e ,  
o n l y  v a l u e s  of t, T (1 /E  > A >  need be c o n s i d e r e d .  A r a t i o n a l  
prof  it maximizing c o r p o r a t e  l z a d e r  (DM) wants  t o  inauimize ne-L 
b e n e f i t s  NE w i t h  r e p s e c t  t o  t h e s e  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s .  Bowever, a s  
t h e  problem is f o r m u l a t e d  h e r e ,  o n l y  two a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t .  Thus, 
it is s u f f i c i e n t  t o  maximize w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  T and t ,  o r ,  
e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  A a n d  B.  
The c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a n  ex t reme  v a l u e  of n e t  b e n e f i t s  a s  a 
f u n c t i o n  of A ,  B ( o r  T, t.,) a r e :  
Unfortunately, the algebraic expressions are quite complex 
and non-linear (transcendental) and they cannot be solved in 
closed form. Thus, in general, a simulation approach has been 
undertaken. The results are summarized hereafter. Plots of W<t> 
and net benefits (m) vs. t, for various choices of W(t) and 
values of t are presented in the Appendix. 
Results and Conclusions 
The quantitative analysis yields a very clear qualitative 
conclusion in terms of optimal R&D investment policy. The result 
is summarized below: 
L i f e  ~:ycle  S t a g e  Time P re fe r ence  W (t > O ~ t i , ? l a l  RhD P o l i c y  
E a r  1 y  Decreas ing Shor t - t e rm 
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Shor t - t e rm 
(Improvement) 
( T  s m a l l )  
Sae Figu re  9 
Late  I n c r e a s i n g  Long-term 
(senescence > ( n e g a t i v e  d i s c o u n t  > (T  l a r g e ,  t, l a r g e >  
See F igu re  10 
From o t h e r  ev idence ,  it a p p e a r s  t h a t  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  s t a g e  of t h e  
c y c l e  product  improvement w i l l  predominate ,  whereas i n  t h e  l a t e r  
s t a g e ,  Drocess improvement w i l l  be emphasized [ Abernathy B 
Utte rback  751. I t  is remarkable  t h a t  t h e  op t ima l  R&D p o l i c y  is 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  t h e  s h o r t  t e rm  one,  u n t i l  a l a t e  s t a g e  of t h e  l i f e  
c y c l e ,  when t h e  "end of p r o s p e r i t y "  is c l e a r l y  f o r e s e e a b l e . "  
But,  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n s  W ( t >  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  is r e v e r s e d .  
(The p o l i c y  r e v e r s a l  c o n d i t i o n s  can  be exp lo red  more c l o s e l y  w i t h  
t h e  h e l p  of t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  model) .  
Let  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c c e s s i v e l y  i n  3 s t a g e s  of 
t h e  l i f e  c y c l e ,  beg inn ing  w i t h  a n  e a r l y  ( ch i ldhood /ado le scen t )  
view. For example, suppose we assume a f a m i l y  of d e c l i n i n g  
f u n c t i o n s  W ( t > ,  a s  shown i n  F igu re  7a .  Cases  1 th rough  5 
cor respond  t o  d i s c o u n t  r a t e s  w i th  i n c r e a s i n g l y  p o s i t i v e  v a l u e s .  
Let  u s  now assume a n  R&D p r o j e c t  w i th  a n  i n i t i a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
t e c h n i c a l  s u c c e s s  of 0 . 5  <T=0>.  The r e s u l t i n g  c u r v e s  f o r  t h e  n e t  
b e n e f i t s  NB, a s  a f u n c t i o n  of t,, a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  7b. Note 
t h a t  each NB c u r v e  r e a c h e s  a maximum v a l u e  f o r  some va lue  of t,, 
and t h e n  d e c l i n e s  and f i n a l l y  becomes n e g a t i v e .  
The optimum s t r a t e g y  f o r  a v e n t u r e  c a p i t a l i s t  making a  one- 
t i m e  investment  is t o  p rov ide  enough money f o r  t h e  v e n t u r e  t o  
c o n t i n u e  u n t i l  t h e  maximum v a l u e  of expec t ed  NB b e f o r e  
d i s o c u n t  i ng .  The s i t u a t i o n  is more compl i ca t ed  i f  p r o j e c t s  can  
be n e t  e v a l u a t e d  each  y e a r  and " t u r n e d  o f f "  a t  any t ime ,  based on 
new in fo rma t ion .  In  t h i s  c a s e ,  however, a l l  p a s t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
a r e  r ega rded  as  "such" c o s t s  and o n l y  expec t ed  f u t u r e  c o s t s  and  
b e n e f i t s  need be c o n s i d e r e d S G  In  t h e  case of annua l  r e -  
" In  p r i n c i p l e ,  of c o u r s e .  In  p r a c t i c e  managers of mature  
and s e n e s c e n t  i n d u s t r i e s  o f t e n  f a i l  t o  r ecogn ize  t h i s  p o i n t ,  even  
a f t e r  it is e v i d e n t  t o  o u t s i d e r s .  
e.Annual r e - e v a l u a t i o n  g i v e s  t h e  l a r g e  f i r m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  a 
p o r t f o l i o  of in-house R&D p r o j e c t s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  
advantage  ove r  t h e  v e n t u r e  c a p i t a l i s t  who must e k e  longer - te rm 
commitments. 
Figure 7a. A family o f  time-preference functions for  
scenario  I (Early i n  the  l i f e  c y c l e ,  
p o s i t i v e  discounting. 
Fiqure 7b. Expected net  b e n e f i t  curves for  various tinie- 
preference functions,  assunin? T = 0 .  
evaluation, the criterion for continuation is aiso somewhat more 
(=omplex and need not be discussed here. 
The effect of varying the initial probabili~y of Technical 
success is next shown in Figures 9a and 8b. (The W(t) fllnction 
shown in Figure 8a is not identical to any of those in Figure 7a, 
aithough it most nearly resembles case 5 ) .  Qualitatively, it can 
be seen that the greater the initial ?robability of technical 
success the higher the maximum value of expected net benefits, 
and the shorter the optimum period of R&D. This result leaves no 
doubt that the optimal R&D policy during the early part of the 
life cycle is short-term and low risk. 
We now consider the effect of moving through the life cycle. 
As time passes, the rate of market and profits growth slows and a 
time might come when a few large, stable, oligopolistic (or 
regulated) firms have a commodity-like makret that is no longer 
growing significantly, but which is also "safe". In this case 
the situation is intermediate: neither scenario I nor scenario 
I 1  is applicable, and the best time-preference function is simply 
Wit) = 1. 
The expected net-benefit (XB) curves for this case are shown 
in Figure 9. Comparing Figure 9 and Figure Sb, it can be seen 
that there is not much difference for the case P, (8)  = 0.88 (jT = 
2 ) ,  which has it maximum value for rather small values of t,, but 
projects with smaller initial success probabilities becomes much 
more attractive. Nevertheless, if W(t> = 1, the short-term low- 
risk project is still preferable, other factors remaining equal. 
The stable intermediate case considered above may persist 
for some time, but in general the life cycle moves inexorably on 
to an unstable situation more like scenario 11. One possible 
time-preference function for this case is depicted in Figure 18a. 
The corresponding expected net benefit curves are shown in Figure 
Icbb. 
A very remarkable preference "reversal" phenomenon is 
observed by comparing Figure 10b with Figure 9 or Figure 8b. 
Providing the firm is financially able to continue investing for 
long enough, the optimum R8D project is one that has its maximum 
expected value later, rather than earlier. This im~lies that 
late in the life cycle a risky, long-term project of ~ i v e n  
'value' can be preferred to a safe short-term project. 
This result must be interpeted with some care, of course. 
If the planning horizon (2) were allowed to become indefinitely 
large, so that t, is unlimited, the above result seems to imply 
that P., (0) should become infinitesimal. This is obvious 
nonsense, because in such a case NB would also remain negative 
for an indefinitely long time! In reality, therefore, the 
maximum planning horizon is a constraint on the problem and t, < 
2. Subject to this caveat, what we have shown is that in a 
simple mathematical 'model' world, external circumstances (i. e. 
the life-cycle) can strongly influence attitude to risk. In 
fact, the conventional idea that 'risk aversion' or 'risk- 
seeking' are unchanging characteristics of decision makers must 
now be challenged. 
Figure 8a. A tire preference funct ion f o r  s cenar io  I 
(Early phase) , p o s i t i v e  d i scount inc .  
Figure Eb. r x ~ e c t e d  n e t  b e n e f i t s  f o r  various values  o f  
P 1 ( 0 )  f r o c  0 . 1 2  t o  0.8E. 
Figure  9 .  N e t  b e n e f i t  curves  f o r  c o n s t a n t  W ( t )  = 1  
( I n t e r r e d i a t e  phase) . 
Various va lues  of  P1 (0 )  f r o r  O . 7 2  t o  @.a€? 
F i g u r e  10a. A t ime-preference f u n c t i o n  f o r  s c n e a r i o  I1 
(La te  phase)  , n e g a t i v e  d i s c o u n t i n c .  
F i g u r e  lob.  E x ~ e c t e C  n e t  b e n e f i t  f o r  v a r i o u s  v a l u e s  o f  
P (0 )  from 0.12 t o  0 . 2 t ? .  1 
Figure 10c. Expected net benefits 'or various values of 
PI (0) continued. 
Zviden-cly, W ( t )  can 5e chosen in ~nany ways o7;her than those 
shown above. Some additional simuiations are included in the 
Appendix, to illustrate the sensitivty ci the resul~s to the 
choice of parameters. 
The logic underlying the model discussed in this paper is 
much more general than the specific application to RSsD. 
Applications in other fields will be considered in subsequent 
papers. In conclusion, we emphasize that long-term, high risk 
ventures can never be just if ied by a benef it/cost methodology 
using time-preference functions equivalent to positive discount 
rates. The increasingly mindless use of packaged 'modeis' (such 
as DCF)  by business economists is an ominous development, in this 
cont ext . 
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APPEND I X 
Here, substituting A= ecr ,  X= J 1: .> and B= . -J t.';: 
( - >  dx= i - j>  X d t  ) 
and rearranging terms, we can obtain 
CIB 
1 2C-X a 1 
- D1A (-1 - 2DaAe (-1 
CI Aa X X e  I 
The a ~ o v e  result and the following equatian: 
derive expected benefit as 
if t, --> +-or B --> + 0 9  t h e n  XE c a n  be a p p r o x i - m t e d  by 
Where A,@. 
I n  c a s e  of D,.,,@, t h e n  a s  is shown below, NB d i v e r g e s  t o  F o s i t i v e  
i n f i n i t e  v a l u e  a s  t~ i n c r e a s e s  ( o r  B converges  t o  z e r o , ) .  
Z proof1 L e t  d e f i n e  y as 
I. L b 2 r e  e x i s t s  p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  M i a  and  
is o b t a i n e d  
The i a s t  t e r m  ai t h e  r i g h t  hand s i d e  d i v e r g e s  s o  p o s i t i v e  
i n f i n i t e  a s  B --> + d and o t h e r  t e r m s  conve rge  t o  z e r o .  
T h e r e f o r e  i n  c a s e  of  D:, ? (d, t h e r e  is no o p t i m a l  t,:: f o r  any  v a l u e  
of A .  
c (a. E. Dl 
When D,= 8 and 3 ,  > @  t h e n  NE c a n  be approxirnntecl by 
NB= VP, (-AD, !Ln3 + LnB 
= < L - VP,ADl j LnB . 
T h e r e f o r e  w e  c a n  o b t a i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  c a s e s .  
if VPzADl > 1 t h e n  NB --> + 
1 
I 
VPzADl = 1 t h e n  XB - -?  c , a s  B --;, 8 
VP,AD, < 1 t h e n  NB - -? - I 4 ( tF --> + 
A s  is s u g g e s t e d  i n  t h e  a b o v e ,  t h e r e  may be many cases on 
b e h a v i o r  of NB. 
Some examples of behavior of NB 
Case Dl = 0.025, D2 = C1 - C2 = 0. Co =0.975, Pq.v= 79 
& 
1) j~ : 2, 2) j~ = 1, 3) jT = 0, 4) jT = -1, 5) jT = -2. 

Yain Case A 
S a t u r a t i n g  W ( t )  
( W ( t )  -t c o n s t a n t  a s  t -t co). 
Case T = 0, v.? = 10, j = 1 2. 
C2 = 0, Dl = D* = 0 
F i g u r e  A-1 

Case 
Case T = O ,  V - P 2 =  7.5, j = 1  

Case T = 0, V ' P 2  = 7.5, j = 1 
Case 


